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Abstract
Since automatic speaker verification (ASV) systems are highly
vulnerable to spoofing attacks, it is important to develop mech-
anisms that can detect such attacks. To be practical, however,
a spoofing attack detection approach should have (i) high ac-
curacy, (ii) be well-generalized for practical attacks, and (iii)
be simple and efficient. Several audio-based spoofing detection
methods have been proposed recently but their evaluation is lim-
ited to less realistic databases containing homogeneous data. In
this paper, we consider eight existing presentation attack de-
tection (PAD) methods and evaluate their performance using
two major publicly available speaker databases with spoofing
attacks: AVspoof1 and ASVspoof2. We first show that realis-
tic presentation attacks (speech is replayed to PAD system) are
significantly more challenging for the considered PAD meth-
ods compared to the so called ‘logical access’ attacks (speech is
presented to PAD system directly). Then, via a cross-database
evaluation, we demonstrate that the existing methods generalize
poorly when different databases or different types of attacks are
used for training and testing. The results question the efficiency
and practicality of the existing PAD systems, as well as, call
for creation of databases with larger variety of realistic speech
presentation attacks.
Index Terms: speaker anti-spoofing, presentation attacks,
cross-database testing, open source
1. Introduction
Recent years have shown an increase in both the accuracy
of biometric systems and their practical use. The application
of biometrics is becoming widespread with fingerprint sensors
in smartphones, automatic face recognition in social networks
and video-based applications, and speaker recognition in phone
banking and other phone-based services. The popularization
of the biometric systems, however, exposed their major flaw
— high vulnerability to spoofing attacks [1]. A fingerprint
sensor can be easily tricked with a simple glue-made mold, a
face recognition system can be accessed using a printed photo,
and a speaker recognition can be spoofed with a replay of pre-
recorded voice. The ease with which a biometric system can
be spoofed demonstrates the importance of developing efficient
anti-spoofing systems that can detect both known (conceivable
now) and unknown (possible in the future) spoofing attacks.
In this paper, we focus on the spoofing attack detection
or presentation attack detection (PAD) systems in the context
of voice biometrics. Although the research in this area is far
from being matured, several approaches have been proposed re-
cently, mostly focusing on feature extraction component of anti-
1https://www.idiap.ch/dataset/avspoof
2http://datashare.is.ed.ac.uk/handle/10283/853
spoofing systems. A survey by Wu et al. [2] provides a compre-
hensive overview of the spoofing attacks and the currently avail-
able anti-spoofing methods. These methods use features mostly
based on the audio spectrogram, such as spectral- and cepstral-
based features [3], phase-based features [4], the combination of
amplitude and phase features [5], and audio quality based fea-
tures [6]. Also, a higher computational layer can be added, for
instance, Alegre et al. [7] proposed to use histograms of local
binary patterns (LBP), which can be computed directly from
a set of pre-selected spectral, phase-based, or other features.
Most of these features are used successfully in speaker verifica-
tion systems already, so, naturally, they are first to be proposed
for anti-spoofing systems as well. However, to demonstrate that
the anti-spoofing methods work, they need to be evaluated on a
dataset with a set of comprehensive spoofing attacks that pose a
real threat to the state of the art speaker verification systems [8].
Although, the number of speech databases with spoofing at-
tacks is significantly limited, two major databases were created
recently: ASVspoof1 [9], as part of the 2015 Interspeech anti-
spoofing challenge, and AVspoof2 [10]. Most of the available
work on speaker anti-spoofing, essentially, focuses on detect-
ing synthetic speech, such as voice conversion, speech synthe-
sis, and artificial signals [2]. The synthetically generated at-
tacks are assumed to be fed into a verification system directly
bypassing its microphone, hence, they are coined as ‘logical
access’ attacks [9]. This type of attacks constitute ASVspoof
database. The most practical replay attacks, which are formally
defined as presentation attacks by ISO standardization commit-
tee [11], received considerably less attention, since, until now,
there was no public dataset with such attacks. That is why
AVspoof database [10] is of great interest, since it is the first
database that contains several types of replay attacks.
To overcome the lack of evaluations of the currently avail-
able spoofing attack detection methods on presentation attacks
and to find out how well these methods generalize across dif-
ferent types of attacks, we need an extensive cross-database
evaluations of the state-of the art. By taking the recent work
of Sahidullah et al. [12], which benchmarked several anti-
spoofing systems, as a starting point, we have selected several
well-performing methods and developed their open source im-
plementation3 based on a well-known Bob framework [13]4.
Hence, we have implemented: GMM-based classifier us-
ing cepstral-based features with rectangular (RFCC), mel-
scaled triangular (MFCC) [14], inverted mel-scaled triangular
(IMFCC), and linear triangular (LFCC) filters [15], spectral
flux-based features (SSFC) [16], subband centroid frequency
(SCFC) [17], and subband centroid magnitude (SCMC) [17]
features, as well as, features of LBP histograms computed us-
3Source code: https://pypi.python.org/pypi/bob.paper.interspeech 2016
4http://idiap.github.io/bob/
Speech signal
Framed signal Spectrogram
SCFC(20) ΔΔ2
RFCC(20) ΔΔ2
LFCC(20) ΔΔ2
MFCC(20) ΔΔ2
IMFCC(20) ΔΔ2
SSFC(20) ΔΔ2
SCMC(20) ΔΔ2
LFCC(16) ΔΔ2 + 
LBP histograms
GMM 512
PCA and Logistic 
Regression
Features Classifiers
Figure 1: Processing flow of considered PAD systems.
ing LFCC [7] with a PCA-based dimensionality reduction and
logistic regression classifier. Figure 1 illustrates the processing
flow of the implemented PAD systems.
We demonstrate the effect of presentation (or replay) at-
tacks on the selected anti-spoofing systems compared to syn-
thetically generated attacks. And to understand how well
these systems generalize across different databases and different
types of data, we conducted an extensive cross-database evalu-
ation by (i) training the systems on data from one database and
testing them on data from another database, and (ii) training
them on one type of data (‘logical access’ or presentation at-
tacks) and testing them on another type of data.
Therefore, the main contributions of this paper include (i)
open source implementation of eight state of the art speaker
spoofing detection systems, (ii) evaluation of these systems on
presentation attacks from AVspoof database, and (iii) compara-
tive performance and cross-database testing using AVspoof and
ASVspoof databases.
2. Spoofing detection methods
We have selected several state of the art methods for spoofing
attacks detection in speech (please see Figure 1 for an illustra-
tion), which were recently evaluated by Sahidullah et al. [12] on
ASVspoof database. Taking already benchmarked approaches
allow us to compare and cross-validate our open source imple-
mentations3 with the results presented in [12].
By following [12], we adopted GMM-based classifier (two
models for real and attacks), since it led to a better performance
compared to SVM. We selected four cepstral-based features
with rectangular (RFCC), mel-scale triangular (MFCC) [14],
inverted mel-scale triangular (IMFCC), and linear triangular
(LFCC) filters [15]. These features are computed from a power
spectrum (power of magnitude of 512-sized FFT) by apply-
ing one of the above filters of a given size (we use size 20 as
per [12]). We also implemented spectral flux-based features
(SSFC) [16], which are Euclidean distances between power
spectrums (normalized by the maximum value) of two consecu-
tive frames, subband centroid frequency (SCFC) [17], and sub-
band centroid magnitude (SCMC) [17] features. A discrete co-
sine transform (DCT-II) is applied to all above features, except
for SCFC, and first 20 coefficients are taken.
For the comparison with the above systems, we also imple-
mented features using histograms of uniform local binary pat-
terns (uLBP(8,1)) [7] computed from LFCCs (16 coefficients,
deltas, and double-deltas [18]), which is one of the first meth-
ods proposed for anti-spoofing detection in speech. However,
instead of using a histogram intersection for classification be-
tween real data and attacks, to increase the accuracy of detec-
tion closer to practical values, we used logistic regression with
prior PCA-based dimensionality reduction.
Before computing selected features, a given audio sample is
first split into overlapping 20ms-long speech frames with 10ms
overlap. The frames are pre-emphasized with 0.97 coefficient
and pre-processed by applying Hamming window. Then, for all
features, except for LBP-based features [7], we compute deltas
and double-deltas [18] and keep only these features (40 in to-
tal) for the classifier. We kept only deltas and double-deltas,
because [12] reported that static features degraded performance
of PAD systems.
3. Spoofing databases
For our cross-database benchmarking of selected anti-spoofing
methods, we have selected two recent and the most comprehen-
sive to date publicly available databases with speech spoofing
attacks: ASVspoof and AVspoof.
3.1. ASVspoof
ASVspoof1 database was created for a 2015 Interspeech anti-
spoofing challenge [9]. It contains genuine speech data from
106 speakers (45 male and 61 female), while spoofed speech
was generated using speech synthesis and voice conversion al-
gorithms. In total, database has 10 spoofing attacks, five of
which are considered ‘unknown’, since they appear in the evalu-
ation set only and their nature was not known to the participants
at the time of the evaluation. However, it is important to note
that ASVspoof database was built with an assumption that the
attackers have a direct access (or what the authors called ‘logical
access’) to a verification system. It means that the database does
not contain more realistic presentation attacks [11] and hence,
basically, is a database of synthetic speech. For more details on
ASVspoof database, please refer to [9].
3.2. AVspoof
To our knowledge, the largest publicly available database con-
taining speech presentation attacks is AVspoof [10]2.
AVspoof database contains real (genuine) speech samples
from 44 participants (31 males and 13 females) recorded over
the period of two months in four sessions, each scheduled sev-
eral days apart in different setups and environmental conditions
Table 1: Performance of PAD systems on ASVspoof [9] and AVspoof [10] with results in [12] EER (%) column copied from [12].
PAD system ASVspoof (Eval) AVspoof (Eval)
[12] EER (%) Bob3 EER (%) Bob3 HTER (%) Bob3 HTER (%)
Known Unknown Known Unknown LA PA
SCFC(20)∆∆2, GMM512 0.07 8.84 0.10 5.17 0.00 5.15
RFCC(20)∆∆2, GMM512 0.12 1.92 0.12 1.32 0.03 2.70
LFCC(20)∆∆2, GMM512 0.11 1.67 0.13 1.20 0.00 5.00
MFCC(20)∆∆2, GMM512 0.39 3.84 0.46 2.93 0.00 5.34
IMFCC(20)∆∆2, GMM512 0.15 1.86 0.20 1.57 0.01 3.76
SSFC(20)∆∆2, GMM512 0.30 1.96 0.23 1.60 0.70 4.17
SCMC(20)∆∆2, GMM512 0.17 1.71 0.18 1.37 0.01 3.24
uLBP(8,1), PCA and LR N/A N/A 9.95 21.30 0.65 5.89
Table 2: Cross database testing on ASVspoof [9] and AVspoof [10] databases of PAD systems (open source implementations3).
PAD system HTER (%)
ASVspoof (Train/Dev) AVspoof-LA (Train/Dev)
AVspoof-LA (Eval) AVspoof-PA (Eval) ASVspoof (Eval) AVspoof-PA (Eval)
SCFC(20)∆∆2, GMM512 1.43 6.48 19.99 7.56
RFCC(20)∆∆2, GMM512 34.93 38.54 25.58 13.20
LFCC(20)∆∆2, GMM512 0.71 10.58 18.44 8.40
MFCC(20)∆∆2, GMM512 1.87 9.82 10.13 5.15
IMFCC(20)∆∆2, GMM512 2.28 46.49 21.80 49.57
SSFC(20)∆∆2, GMM512 34.64 41.68 43.50 36.26
SCMC(20)∆∆2, GMM512 1.23 12.16 22.99 7.97
uLBP(8,1), PCA and LR 58.38 53.00 44.34 49.10
such as background noises. The first session was recorded in
the most controlled conditions. Speech samples were recorded
using three devices: laptop using microphone AT2020USB+,
Samsung Galaxy S4 phone, and iPhone 3GS.
From the recorded genuine data, two major types of at-
tacks were created for AVspoof database: ‘logical access’ at-
tacks, similar to those in ASVspoof database [9], and presen-
tation attacks, as they are defined by ISO standardization com-
mittee [11]. ‘Logical access’ attacks are generated using (i) a
statistical parametric-based speech synthesis algorithm [19] and
(ii) a voice conversion algorithm from Festvox5.
When generating presentation attacks, the assumption is
that a verification system is installed on a laptop (with an inter-
nal built-in microphone) and an attacker is trying to gain access
to this system by playing back to it a pre-recorded genuine data
or an automatically generated synthetic data using some play-
back device. In AVspoof database, presentation attacks consist
of (i) direct replay attacks when a genuine data is played back
using a laptop with internal speakers, a laptop with external high
quality speakers, Samsung Galaxy S4 phone, and iPhone 3G,
(ii) synthesized speech replayed with a laptop, and (iii) con-
verted voice attacks replayed with a laptop. For more details on
AVspoof database, please refer to [10].
4. Evaluation results
Open source implementations3 of the selected spoofing detec-
tion methods (see Section 2 for details) are evaluated by com-
puting a half total error rate (HTER) on the evaluation set of a
database, which is a mean of false acceptance rate (FAR) and
false reject rate (FRR) computed using a threshold found from
the development set (see [8] for more details).
5http://festvox.org/
4.1. Comparative evaluation ASVspoof vs. AVspoof
The results of evaluating the selected methods on different types
of attacks from ASVspoof and AVspoof databases are presented
in Table 1. These results are obtained by training each anti-
spoofing method (i.e., a PAD system) on a training (Train) set
of a given database, then tuned on development (Dev) set and
tested on evaluation (Eval) set of the same database.
In Table 1, the results for ‘known’ and ‘unknown’ attacks
(see columns titled as Bob EER (%) to indicate our Bob-based
open source implementation) of Eval set of ASVspoof are pre-
sented separately. Thus, our results can be compared with
results reported in Table 4 of [12] (Matlab implementation),
which we also included in Table 1 for convenience (columns ti-
tled as [12] EER (%)). Also, equal error rates (EER) are shown
for these sets to keep the results comparable with [12]. We
can observe that both implementations lead to similar results
for ‘known’ attacks, while our Bob-based system shows smaller
error rates for ‘unknown’ attacks.
For AVspoof database, only the results for our Bob-based
implementation are shown in Table 1, since AVspoof database
was not used in [12]. Since AVspoof contains both ‘logical ac-
cess’ (LA for short) and presentation attacks (PA), the results
for these two types of attacks are presented separately, to allow
comparing the performance on ASVspoof database (it has ‘log-
ical access’ attacks only) with an AVspoof-LA attacks. From
these results, we can note that (i) LA set of AVspoof is less
challenging compared to ASVspoof for all methods, except for
SSFC-based, and (ii) presentation attacks are significantly more
challenging compared to LA attacks. The increase in HTER for
almost all PAD systems in more than 100 times for PA com-
pared to LA attacks of AVspoof means that presentation attacks,
besides emulating a more realistic spoofing scenario, pose a se-
rious threat to the state of the art systems and need to be con-
sidered in all future evaluations of anti-spoofing systems.
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Figure 2: DET curves for MFCC(20) ∆∆2, GMM512 PAD system when it is trained on one database and evaluated on another.
Table 3: Per attack results for RFFC and MFCC-based systems.
Attacks ASVspoof (Train) AVspoof-LA (Train)
MFCC RFCC MFCC RFCC
AVSpoof-LA SS 1.45 34.78 0.00 1.07
(Eval) VC 1.88 34.93 0.00 0.00
AVSpoof-PA SS 3.51 35.14 24.91 40.09
(Eval) SS-HQ 22.93 39.11 11.52 36.79
VC 6.21 35.65 0.90 9.40
VC-HQ 6.30 35.40 1.12 10.32
RE 48.25 72.20 49.98 49.99
4.2. Cross-database evaluation
Table 2 presents the cross-database results when a given PAD
system is trained and tuned using training and development sets
from one database but is tested using evaluation set from an-
other database. For instance, results in the second column of the
table are obtained by using training and development sets from
ASVspoof database but evaluation set from AVspoof-LA. Also,
we evaluated the effect of using one type of attacks (e.g., ‘log-
ical access’ from AVspoof-LA) for training and another type
(e.g., presentation attacks of AVspoof-PA) for testing (the re-
sults are in the last column of the table).
From the results in Table 2, we can note that all methods
generalize poorly across different datasets with HTER reaching
50%. It is also interesting to note that even similar methods, for
instance, RFCC and MFCC-based, have very different accuracy
in cross-database testing, even though they showed less drastic
difference in single-database evaluations (see Table 1). To un-
derstand the cause for such drastic difference in performances,
we split the results for RFCC and MFCC-based methods for
each attack of AVspoof database separately, as shown in Ta-
ble 3. The rows of the table indicate the attacks, including ‘log-
ical access’ speech synthesis (SS) and voice conversion (VC) in
AVspoof-LA, and replay or presentation attacks of speech syn-
thesis (SS), speech synthesis replayed with high quality speak-
ers (SS-HQ), voice conversion (VC), voice conversion replayed
with high quality speakers (VC-HQ), and replay attacks with
laptop and phones (RE). We can note that the main difference
between RFCC and MFCC-based methods is in SS and VC at-
tacks, while both methods perform almost equally poorly on
RE attacks. It means MFCC-based system is more sensitive to
synthetic attacks and, since such synthetic attacks constitute the
majority of the overall attacks, it led to the overall low HTER
for MFCC-based system. But none of the systems work well on
RE attacks.
To provide more details on how MFCC-based PAD sys-
tem performs on different databases, we plot its detection er-
ror tradeoff (DET) curves in Figure 2. Figure 2a shows DET
curves when the method is trained on ASVspoof database and
Figure 2b shows when it is trained on AVspoof-LA. In both
plots, we can notice that the PAD system is misbalanced: a
small decrease in false acceptance rate of spoofing attacks has
a cost of having large increase in false rejection rate. This is
especially true when the system is evaluated using attacks from
AVspoof-PA, which again emphasizes the challenge that pre-
sentation attacks pose to the current PAD systems.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we conducted a cross-database evaluation of sev-
eral state of the art speech spoofing attacks detection methods
implemented as open source. We used two recent comprehen-
sive databases with speech spoofing attacks: ASVspoof (‘logi-
cal access’ attacks only) and AVspoof (‘logical access’ and pre-
sentation attacks). The evaluation results demonstrated that all
methods generalize poorly, especially, when they are trained on
‘logical access’ attacks and tested on more realistic presenta-
tion attacks, which means a new and more practically applica-
ble anti-spoofing methods need to be developed. Databases with
larger variety of attacks in both training and testing sets are also
needed.
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